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Foreword

A Consequential Justice
Robert A. Stein

†

Antonin Scalia served as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States for more than twenty-nine years
from his appointment by President Ronald Reagan in 1986 to
his death in 2016. At the time of his death, Justice Scalia was
the senior Justice on the Court. Justice Scalia’s length of
service on the Court ranks 15th longest among the 112 Justices
1
in Supreme Court history.
It is not the length of Justice Scalia’s service on the Court,
but rather the consequence of his opinions that most
distinguishes him. During his years on the Court, Justice
Scalia was able to lead the Court to the right in a number of
areas of law.
When Justice Scalia visited the University of Minnesota
2
Law School for a lecture and conversation on October 20, 2015,
he described Justice William Brennan as “the most influential
3
Justice of the twentieth century.” In fact, Justice Scalia and
Justice Brennan together represent two of the most
consequential Justices on the Court during the sixty years
since Justice Brennan’s appointment in 1956—Justice Brennan
moving the Court to the left, and Justice Scalia subsequently
moving the Court to the right.
† Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
I would like to thank Nicholas R. Bednar, 2016 graduate of the University of
Minnesota Law School, for his superb assistance in the preparation of this
article. Copyright © 2016 by Robert A. Stein.
1. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_
text.aspx (last visited July 6, 2016).
2. The 2015 Stein Lecture: U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia,
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.umn.edu/events/
2015-stein-lecture-us-supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia (last visited July 6,
2016).
3. Justice Antonin Scalia, The 2015 Stein Lecture at the University of
Minnesota (Oct. 20, 2015) [hereinafter The 2015 Stein Lecture].
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The manner by which Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia
led the Court, however, was quite different. Justice Brennan,
perhaps more than any other Justice in Supreme Court history,
was a master in drafting an opinion to secure at least five votes
to decide a case. Justice Scalia, however, has emphasized that
his originalist and textualist jurisprudence left him with
4
“nothing to trade.” Rather, Justice Scalia shifted the Court to
the right through sheer intellect and combative opinionwriting, which emphasized his own constitutional ideology. By
comparing Justice Scalia to Justice Brennan, it becomes clear
that, like Justice Brennan, Justice Scalia was a consequential
Justice.
To those monitoring Justice Brennan’s appointment in
1956, it would come as a shock that he would lead the Warren
5
Court’s expansion of civil rights, liberties, and judicial power.
Amidst a presidential election, President Dwight Eisenhower
hoped to use the appointment of Justice Brennan to appease
6
Catholic voters and the Association of State Court Judges.
Attorney General Herbert Brownell suggested Justice Brennan
for Justice Sherman Minton’s seat following a speech given by
Justice Brennan, which Brownell believed “seemed markedly
7
conservative.” To Brownell, the future-Justice Brennan
appeared more concerned with judicial administration than
constitutional issues—a conservative Justice, but a Democrat,
who could balance the Warren Court’s penchant for
8
constitutional activism.
Brownell was wrong. Chief Justice Warren, a man with a
vision, and Justice Brennan, a negotiator and tactician, formed
an immediate alliance. As he was instrumental to the Warren
Court’s project of constitutional expansion, his colleagues on
the Court referred to Justice Brennan as “Deputy Chief.”
Justice Brennan mastered the art of writing a majority opinion
that could secure five votes.
4. Id. (“The originalist has nothing to trade.”).
5. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, THE LAST LIBERAL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.
AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 13 (1993) (“Who was this
Brennan, who had managed to attract five other Justices to his opinion and
accomplish in an easy 6 to 2 majority, something Black had failed to do in
sixteen years? Who was this man, virtual unknown, appointed by the
conservative President Eisenhower, who seemed to be stepping past even the
most tepid predictions of his influence?”).
6. Id. at 89.
7. Id. at 85.
8. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Prior to Justice Brennan’s arrival, scholars questioned
whether the Warren Court would continue its constitutional
9
push for civil rights, started in Brown v. Board of Education.
Cooper v. Aaron afforded Justice Brennan the opportunity to
10
revitalize the Court’s liberal agenda. During oral arguments,
Justice Brennan drilled the state government on its failure to
pursue desegregation as a violation of the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause. Justice Brennan’s Supremacy Clause
comments formed the crux of the majority opinion, ghost11
written by Justice Brennan on behalf of Chief Justice Warren.
Justice Brennan’s early efforts to restore judicial supremacy to
the Court paved the way for future holdings, as well as building
trust among the Court’s more absolutist judges, such as Justice
12
William O. Douglas.
Perhaps no opinion demonstrates Justice Brennan’s ability
13
to negotiate and expand the Court’s power than Baker v. Carr.
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Baker recast the political
question doctrine and held that redistricting issues presented
14
justiciable questions. The road to such a momentous holding,
however, was turbulent and fraught with contention. After two
days of oral arguments, the Justices found themselves
confronted with a 4–4 split, with Justice Potter Stewart
15
refusing to decide at the first conference. Chief Justice
Warren pushed the decision to the next term and called for a
second round of arguments. This time, Justice Stewart
admitted that Justice Brennan’s arguments convinced him to
16
join the majority. At the request of Justice Stewart, Justice
17
Brennan limited his opinion to the federal court’s jurisdiction.
But Justice Brennan’s coalition began to shake. Justice Tom

9. See Harry H. Wellington & Alexander M. Bickel, Legislative Purpose
and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1957)
(“More strikingly, since handing down its judgment in the Segregation Cases,
the Court has declined to write further on the general subject, disposing by per
curiam orders of a number of other cases which can only in the loosest way be
held to be governed by the decision of May, 1954.”) (citations omitted).
10. See generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that states
are bound by Supreme Court decisions under the Supremacy Clause).
11. See EISLER, supra note 5, at 152–53.
12. See id. at 157.
13. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
14. Id.
15. See EISLER, supra note 5, at 171.
16. EISLER, supra note 5, at 172.
17. EISLER, supra note 5, at 173.
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Clark switched from the dissent to the majority, Justice
Douglas threatened to write his own opinion believing Justice
Brennan was not going far enough (a view Justice Clark soon
took himself), and Justice Stewart moved closer toward the
dissent. The drama of the case led Justice Charles Evans
Whittaker to recuse himself—and eventually retire from the
Court. Justices Douglas and Clark called for a stronger opinion
in light of Clark’s more recent opinion, but Justice Brennan
had promised to support Justice Stewart. Justice Brennan
scurried from chamber to chamber in an effort to maintain his
18
majority. On March 26, 1962, Justice Brennan announced his
opinion, joined by Justice Hugo Black and Chief Justice
Warren. Justices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart all wrote
separately. In the end, only Justice Felix Frankfurter and
Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented. Justice Brennan
turned a 5–4 into a 6–2 decision, with one Justice succumbing
to the mental anguish Baker brought before the Court.
Baker v. Carr demonstrates Justice Brennan’s uncanny
ability to write an opinion that could draw five votes for a
majority holding. Fuelled by his willingness to compromise,
Justice Brennan would tell his clerks, “With five votes around
19
here you can do anything.” In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
Justice Brennan wrote eight majority opinion drafts before
20
eventually securing the votes of six Justices. Unlike Justice
Brennan, other liberal Justices, notably Justice Black and
Justice Douglas, often refused to negotiate their position.
Justice Brennan recognized that if the Court was to pursue a
liberal agenda and secure strong majorities, he had to meet his
more conservative colleagues in the middle. As a result of his
ability to form coalitions, Justice Brennan authored some of the
most influential constitutional law opinions of the twentieth
21
century, expanding civil rights, First Amendment rights, and
22
substantive due process.
Justice Brennan became a
consequential Justice not by virtue of strong, uncompromising
ideology, but rather his results-oriented approach to coalition
building.

18. EISLER, supra note 5, at 174–75.
19. EISLER, supra note 5, at 178.
20. EISLER, supra note 5, at 186.
21. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
22. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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When President Ronald Reagan appointed Justice Scalia to
the bench in 1986, commentators suspected he would play a
similar coalition-building role for the conservatives as Justice
23
Brennan had for the liberals. Coalition-building did not
interest Justice Scalia. Rather, Justice Scalia compares more
readily to the absolutist positions of Justices Douglas and
Black. Justice Scalia felt bound by his views as a textualist and
originalist, both of which provided him a formulaic way of
answering legal questions. Yet Justice Scalia was an
intellectual juggernaut. His colorful rhetoric, unapologetic
dissents, and vigorous defense of his ideology reverberated
throughout the conservative legal community. Justice Scalia
fiercely criticized the judicial activist and “living constitution”
24
philosophies of his colleagues, such as Justice Brennan. Even
absent the same cooperative attitude of Justice Brennan,
Justice Scalia managed to shift the Court right in a number of
areas.
At his confirmation hearing, Senator Strom Thurmond
asked Justice Scalia why the U.S. Constitution had endured as
25
“the oldest existing Constitution in the world today.” Justice
Scalia responded:
What makes it work, what assures that those words [in the Bill of
Rights] are not just hollow promises, is the structure of government
that the original Constitution established, the checks and balances
among the three branches, in particular, so that no one of them is
able to “run roughshod” over the liberties of the people as those
26
liberties are described in the Bill of Rights.

Justice Scalia valued the strict structural guarantees of the
U.S. Constitution, namely separation of powers and federalism.
His adherence to these ideals shaped American law and
Supreme Court jurisprudence over the course of three decades.
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court held that the
appointment of an independent counsel to prosecute highranking executive branch officials did not violate the separation
27
of powers. Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter. He feared
that Congress could “effectively compel[ ] a criminal
23. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3 (“Scalia, he’s such a likeable
fellow, he’s going to put together a new conservative coalition. That was
foolish.”).
24. See, e.g., RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT
AND TRADITION 25, 207, 222 (2006).
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id. (alteration in original).
27. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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investigation of a high-level appointee of the President in
connection with his actions arising out of a bitter power dispute
28
between the President and the Legislative Branch.” In
passing the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Congress
revoked the President’s investigative and charging authority as
the federal government’s sole executive under Article II,
Section I of the Constitution, handing those powers instead to a
29
“mini-Executive that is the independent counsel.” Thus, the
statute “deprive[d] the President of exclusive control over that
30
quintessentially executive activity.” Morrison resulted in the
most complete statement of Justice Scalia’s beliefs on the
separation of powers:
Where a private citizen challenges action of the Government on
grounds unrelated to separation of powers, harmonious functioning of
the system demands that we ordinarily give some deference, or a
presumption of validity, to the actions of the political branches in
what is agreed, between themselves at least, to be within their
respective spheres. But where the issue pertains to separation of
powers, and the political branches are (as here) in disagreement,
neither can be presumed correct. The reason is stated concisely by
Madison: “The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the
terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can
pretend to an exclusive or superior right to settling the boundaries
between their respective powers . . . .” Federalist No. 49, p. 314. The
playing field for the present case, in other words, is a level one. As one
of the interested and coordinate parties to the underlying
constitutional dispute, Congress, no more than the President, is
31
entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

Justice Scalia’s defense of the Constitution’s structural
balance struck a chord with Congress and others aligned with
his views. At his confirmation hearings, Justice Samuel Alito
told the Senate that Morrison “hit the separation of powers
doctrine ‘about as hard as heavyweight champ Mike Tyson
32
usually hits his opponents.’” After a growing number of
scandals, Congress grew weary of the often political and
partisan nature of the independent counsel—even allowing the
33
law to lapse for eighteen months in 1992. In 1999, Senator
28. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 732.
30. Id. at 706.
31. Id. at 704–05.
32. Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, After Memo, Democrats Are
Taking Firmer Stance Against Alito Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at
A24.
33. Independent Probes of Clinton Administration Cost Nearly $80
million, CNN (Apr. 1, 1999, 11:32 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/
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Christopher Dodd echoed Justice Scalia’s sentiments: “For 180
years, we had a good system. It can work. It can work again.
34
We don’t need this independent counsel statute.” On June 30,
1999, the independent counsel law lapsed, reverting
35
prosecutorial authority to the Justice Department.
Morrison and its aftermath exemplify Justice Scalia’s
influence on the separation of powers within the branches of
the federal government. Similarly, Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Printz v. United States demonstrates his efforts to
36
curb federal encroachment on states’ rights. Printz concerned
the constitutionality of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, which commanded local law enforcement
officers to conduct background checks on individuals seeking to
37
purchase handguns. Examining eighteenth century statutes,
Justice Scalia argued that the “utter lack of statutes imposing
obligations on the States’ executive (notwithstanding the
attractiveness of that course to Congress), suggests an assumed
38
absence of such power.” The Constitution established a system
39
of “dual sovereignty.” Justice Scalia concluded his opinion by
stating:
Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by
conscripting the State’s officers directly. The Federal Government
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved,
and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary;
such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our
40
constitutional system of dual sovereignty.

Printz demonstrates Justice Scalia’s veneration of
federalist principles. During his time on the Court, Justice
Scalia joined and authored other opinions stripping the federal
stories/1999/04/01/counsel.probe.costs; David Johnston, Weinberger Faces 5
Counts in Iran-Contra Indictment, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1992), http://
www.nytimes.com/1992/06/17/us/weinberger-faces-5-counts-in-iran-contraindictment.html.
34. Senators Predict End to Independent Counsel Act, CNN (Mar. 1, 1999),
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/01/independent.counsel/.
35. Roberto Suro, Power Shifts to Reno Without Special Counsel, WASH.
POST (June 30, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/
counsels/stories/counsel063099.htm.
36. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
37. Id. at 902.
38. Id. at 907–08.
39. Id. at 918.
40. Id. at 935.
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government, namely Congress, of the authority to infringe on
41
states’ rights. Thus, Justice Scalia suppressed many of the
Supreme Court holdings of the Warren Court that
42
strengthened federal supremacy.
In the realm of individual rights, Justice Scalia believed
that his ideology “handcuffed” him, preventing him from
pursuing the “nasty, conservative things” many accused him of
43
wanting to do. At times, his personal beliefs clashed with
originalism. In Texas v. Johnson, in which the Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment protected flag burning, Justice
44
Scalia joined Justice Brennan’s majority opinion. Left to his
personal beliefs, Justice Scalia has stated that he would throw
45
all flag burners in jail. But his originalist reading of the First
Amendment broadly protects freedom of speech and, therefore,
Justice Scalia’s personal preferences succumbed to his
ideological adherences.
In other policy areas, Justice Scalia found an originalist
basis for opinions he otherwise agreed with. No case
46
demonstrates this more than District of Columbia v. Heller.
Heller questioned whether a District of Columbia law
prohibiting the possession of handguns violated the Second
47
Amendment. Pointing to the operative clause of the Second
Amendment, Justice Scalia contended that “‘bear arms’ was
41. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Congress
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Violence
Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (the
Commerce Clause did not permit Congress to regulate the carrying of
handguns). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Congress may
regulate and ban medical marijuana).
42. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) (holding that Congress could use the Commerce Clause to force
businesses to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
43. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3.
44. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
45. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3. During his lecture, Justice
Scalia also included a personal anecdote about Texas v. Johnson:
I was the fifth vote in the flag vote in the flag burning case . . . . I
don’t like people who go around burning the American flag. If it was
up to me, I would put them all in jail. But, I am not a king. And as I
interpret the First Amendment, they are entitled to burn the flag—
their own flag—to protest the country. So, I was the fifth vote. I come
down for breakfast the next morning. My wife, who is a very
conservative woman (she stops me from sliding to the left), she is
scrambling eggs or something at the stove and humming “It’s a Grand
Old Flag.”
46. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
47. Id. at 574.
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unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside
48
of an organized militia.’” The prefatory clause—centered on “a
well regulated Militia”—simply denoted the purpose of the
49
Second Amendment: “to prevent elimination of the militia.”
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the right secured by the
50
Second Amendment is not unlimited. While “the Constitution
leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for combating
[gun violence],” an absolute prohibition on handguns is not one
51
of them.
52
Gun advocates praised Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller.
Liberals claimed Justice Scalia’s love of hunting tainted his
opinion. Judge Richard Posner criticized Justice Scalia’s
opinion as “faux originalism” with a “historicizing glaze on
53
personal values and policy preferences.” Regardless of Judge
Posner’s attacks, Justice Scalia still founded his opinion in
originalism through historical support for his arguments.
Juxtaposed to cases like Texas v. Johnson, it is hard to contend
Justice Scalia merely embraced originalism when it best
advanced his own beliefs. In sum, Justice Scalia’s originalism
informed the Court’s decisions concerned not only with the
structure of U.S. government, but also the substance of U.S.
law.
Justice Scalia’s prominence comes not only from his
majority opinions, but also with his ability to sway the other
branches and the Court through robust and well-argued
opinions. As an ideologue, Justice Scalia preferred his
subjectively “correct” answer to the most mutually agreeable
54
answer. Justice Scalia cites his adherence to originalism and
textualism as the reason for his inability to form coalitions.
Another, perhaps pettier, view suggests that Justice Scalia
isolated himself by attacking his colleagues. Asked whether his
strong language ever made it difficult to secure five votes,
Justice Scalia responded, “You really think my colleagues are
going to mess up American law because they are peeved at me?

48. Id. at 584.
49. Id. at 599.
50. Id. at 626.
51. Id. at 636.
52. Heller: The Supreme Decision, NRA-ILA (June 27, 2008),
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20080627/heller.
53. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 26,
2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness.
54. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3 (“I’d rather be right.”).
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. . . It’s certainly not hampered by the fact that I criticize my
55
[colleague’s opinions].”
One still wonders whether Justice Scalia’s sharp tongue
earned him any grudges. In United States v. Windsor, Justice
Scalia dismissed the majority’s opinion as “legalistic argle56
bargle.” In the spiritual successor to Windsor, Obergefell v.
Hodges, he called the majority’s opinion “as pretentious as its
content is egotistic,” contending that its “profundities are often
57
profoundly incoherent.” Concurring in Glossip v. Gross,
Justice Scalia attacked the dissent: “Even accepting Justice
Breyer’s rewriting of the Eighth Amendment, his argument is
full of internal contradictions and (it must be said) gobbledy58
gook.” His colorful and entertaining opinions captured the
attention of the media and law students. Indeed, he admitted
that he wrote his “interesting” and “memorable” dissents for
law students in hopes for that “next generation” may adopt his
59
ideologies. In contrast, majority opinions confined Justice
60
Scalia to write “what [his] colleague would let [him] write.”
But if Justice Scalia developed a reputation for harsh language
(which he most certainly did), it perhaps made his more
malleable colleagues reluctant to join coalitions backed by
Justice Scalia’s originalist or textualists opinions. Without
internal confirmation, we may never know if Justice Scalia’s
inability to form coalitions, like Justice Brennan was able to do,
was in part due to his aggressive language.
A comparison of Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia
illustrates at least two ways a Justice can become
“consequential.” Justice Brennan is consequential because he
formed coalitions, mobilizing the court to pursue a liberal
agenda—even if this agenda was more moderate than he would
have wanted. Justice Brennan moved the court through
negotiation and willingness to meet his conservative colleagues
halfway. Justice Scalia is consequential for nearly opposite
reasons. Justice Scalia pursued ideology over cooperation. His
unrelenting stances and intellectual prowess made fellow
55. Id.
56. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
57. Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
58. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3.
60. Id.
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judges, lawyers, and lawmakers think about the proper
structure of our government. He moved the Court right by
injecting originalist viewpoints into precedent. Justice Brennan
and Justice Scalia’s goals differed. Whereas Justice Brennan
sought to garner power for the Court to protect civil rights,
Justice Scalia sought to preserve the balance of government.
Both offer invaluable perspectives on the role of the judiciary,
the structure of the federal government, and the substance of
U.S. law. Had their terms overlapped more than four years, we
would have witnessed a proverbial clash of titans on many of
the questions raised by their methodologies and philosophies.
Indeed, in those mere four years Justice Brennan and Justice
61
Scalia often dueled in conflicting dissents and concurrences.
Absent a persistent battle royale, however, we must analyze
the consequence of Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence on the Supreme Court and U.S. law as ships
passing in the night.

61. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990) (clashing on First Amendment rights of corporations); Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (disagreeing on the extent of due process rights
and the meaning of “liberty” and “freedom”); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss.,
487 U.S. 354 (1988) (disputing the extent of Chevron deference).

